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Abstract 
In situations where people have an incentive to coordinate their behavior, law can provide 
a framework for understanding and predicting what others are likely to do. According to the 
focal point theory of expressive law, the law’s articulation of a behavior can sometimes create 
self-fulfilling expectations that it will occur. Existing theories of legal compliance emphasize the 
effect of sanctions or legitimacy; we argue that, in addition to sanctions and legitimacy, law can 
also influence compliance simply by making one outcome salient. We tested this claim in two 
experiments where sanctions and legitimacy were held constant. Experiment 1 demonstrated that 
a mandatory legal rule operating in a property dispute influenced compliance only when there is 
an element of coordination. Experiment 2 demonstrated that a default rule in a contract 
negotiation acted as a focal point for coordinating negotiation decisions. Both experiments 
confirm that legal rules can create a focal point around which people tend to coordinate in a 
mixed motive coordination game. 
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Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal 
Point Theory of Legal Compliance 
 
 
Introduction 
 One central question for social scientists who study law concerns the mechanisms by which 
law affects human behavior; that is, how does law work? Of course, there is no simple answer to 
this question, because a great variety of factors shape and control the impact of law. Perhaps the 
most comprehensively researched factor is sanctions. For economists, questions about the effect 
of law on human behavior begin (and generally end) with the assumption that behavior responds 
to rewards and punishments. That is, people obey law to the extent that legal sanctions raise the 
expected cost of non-compliance beyond the expected benefits (Becker, 1968) 
On the other hand, scholars working from the perspective of other social sciences 
(anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists, among others) recognize 
that motives for compliance are often more complex than the stark cost-benefit analysis assumed 
by economists (Stryker, 1994; Friedman, 2005). To this end, many social scientists who study 
legal compliance emphasize that people generally obey law to the extent they perceive law and 
legal actors as authoritative and legitimate. There are many examples, from many different 
domains. When police treat people with respect and dignity, they gain legitimacy, and as a result, 
cooperation and compliance of citizens (Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Fagan, 2008). Tax authorities 
gain more compliance when they treat people fairly and respectfully (Wenzel, 2002; Murphy, 
2005). The institutional legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court has remained steady over many 
years, and this reserve of goodwill is thought to increase the likelihood of acceptance of 
unpopular court decisions (Caldeira & Gibson, 1992; Gibson, 2007). Indeed, law is a complex 
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structure, and its perceived legitimacy varies widely, over cultures, times, and domains of its 
everyday instantiation (Sarat & Kearns, 1993 p.9; Suchman, 1997 pp.486-90; Calavita, 2001).  
The two approaches of sanctions and legitimacy are quite different from one another. The 
approach that focuses on law working primarily through sanctions is most readily identified with 
the Law & Economics movement; the approach that focuses on law working through legitimacy 
is commonly identified with the Law & Society movement. Together these two different 
approaches dominate the social science debate on legal compliance. In this Article, we aim to 
bridge these two approaches (see generally, Edelman, 2004), by empirically demonstrating a 
third, complementary way that law influences behavior. Our approach incorporates elements of 
the Law & Economics approach in its assumptions about self-interested human behavior, as well 
as elements of the Law & Society approach in its emphasis on the social actor in a social context.   
In recent years, several theorists (e.g., Cooter, 1998; Garrett & Weingast, 1993; Ginsburg & 
McAdams, 2004; Hardin, 1989; Hay & Shleifer, 1998; E. Posner, 2000; McAdams & Nadler 
2005) have argued that in certain circumstances law induces compliance merely by its ability to 
make a particular behavior salient. Law tends to draw attention to the behavior it demands and, 
in certain situations, the fact that everyone’s attention is focused on a particular behavior creates 
an incentive to engage in it. Specifically, when the parties involved have some common 
incentive to “coordinate” their behavior, the law’s articulation of a behavior will tend to create 
self-fulfilling expectations that it will occur. We call this “the focal point theory” of expressive 
law (McAdams & Nadler 2005).  
According to the theory, the focal effect of the law on behavior depends neither on law’s 
legitimacy nor on the existence of legal sanctions. Consider a simple example of coordination: 
drivers in a brand new society are likely to follow a rule that says “drive on the right” primarily 
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because they wish to avoid collisions; fear of sanctions and respect for legal authorities is rather 
beside the point here. Thus, in situations where people have an incentive to coordinate their 
behavior, law can provide a framework for understanding and predicting what others are likely to 
do. The shadow cast by law in these situations helps people predict not what a court is likely to 
do (Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979), but rather, what other people who are also aware of the law 
are likely to do.  
 The focal point claim is modest. Those advocating this understanding of law do not seek to 
displace the dominant theories of legal compliance, but merely to supplement them. Indeed, one 
reason that social science has generally ignored the focal point effect of law, we believe, is that 
other compliance mechanisms are usually more important. Thus, if legal compliance were not so 
significant, it might not much matter that we do not fully understand the reasons for compliance. 
We might be content to know that sanctions and/or legitimacy generate most of the compliance 
we observe without worrying about what generates the rest. By contrast, we assume that the 
issue of legal compliance is a matter of paramount concern, and that scholars and policy-makers 
wish to gain a full understanding about the causal mechanisms that produce compliance with the 
law. If so, then it is important to understand and measure all mechanisms of compliance, 
including law’s “focal effect” – that is, the degree to which the “shadow” cast by a legal rule 
produces self-fulfilling expectations of the behavior the law demands. (For the same reason, we 
should be concerned about additional compliance theories that we do not explore here, such as 
expressive theories of a different sort, e.g., Dharmapala & McAdams, 2003; McAdams, 2000).  
 Another reason that social science has failed to address the focal point theory is that it is 
exceedingly difficult to empirically test in the field. It is possible in the field to obtain measures 
of the perceived threat of legal sanctions as well as the perceived legitimacy of law or legal 
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actors, so one can plausibly separate the effects of the sanctions and legitimacy (e.g., Grasmick 
& Green, 1980; Silberman, 1976; Tyler, 1990). By contrast, in the field, one cannot easily test 
the focal point theory.  The focal effect works by creating salience, yet the salience of a legal rule 
itself is nearly always bound up with the salience of legitimacy and of sanctions. As we explain 
below, it is even possible that sanctions and legitimacy work in part by contributing to the law’s 
ability to generate salience and therefore work in part through the focal effect. We have therefore 
found it necessary to test the focal point effect experimentally, where we can carefully control 
the different elements of law to see if and how salience influences behavior independently of 
legitimacy or sanctions.  
 In previous experiments (McAdams & Nadler 2005), we conducted our first test of the focal 
point theory in a highly abstract setting. To avoid entirely the effect of legal legitimacy and legal 
sanctions, we made no reference to law at all. Instead, pairs of participants interacted in a game 
which paid out real money based on each player’s selection. The game created some conflict 
because different outcomes paid unequal amounts of money, so one outcome was better for one 
participant and the other was better for the other participant. We enhanced the salience of certain 
choices in the game by issuing a recommendation from a third party (either a mechanical spinner 
or another participant). We found that third party messages highlighting a particular outcome 
influenced players to select that outcome, even though there were no sanctions for ignoring the 
message and even when the source of the message was not imbued with legitimacy. This 
experiment demonstrated that, despite the conflict between the individuals playing the game, a 
third party’s “mere” expression could influence how the players behaved.  
 In this prior work, we argued that the experiment demonstrated the focal effect of law based 
on an inference that law is a type of third-party expression. In other words, we interpreted our 
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results as demonstrating that, in certain circumstances, any third party expression can influence 
behavior by making certain outcomes salient. So we asserted that, if expression as weak as a 
spinner or randomly selected individual can influence behavior merely by expressing it, then law 
can do the same. But the last step of our reasoning was not directly tested by the experiment. 
Because we used an abstract design making no mention of law, we could not directly test 
whether law specifically has this focal effect. By contrast, in the two experiments we report here, 
we supply the missing piece of the puzzle by directly testing the effect of “law.” To do so, we 
used two highly contextualized settings, as explained in detail below. Our results are consistent 
with our prior finding that, controlling for legitimacy and sanctions, law can influence behavior 
expressively. In particular, we find that people are more likely to indicate a willingness to obey 
law in those precise circumstances where the theory predicts a focal effect than in circumstances 
where the theory predicts no focal effect. 
 We proceed as follows. Section I explains the focal point theory. Section II and Section III 
report two new contextualized experiments. Section IV concludes. 
 
I. The Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law 
 The theory we test arises out of the economic theory of strategic interaction – “game theory” 
– which we present in informal terms.  The focal point theory of expressive law relies on four 
claims: (1) that individuals’ need for “coordination” is pervasive; (2) that where individuals need 
to coordinate among possible behaviors, any feature of the environment that causes one behavior 
to be salient will tend to produce that behavior; and (3) that public third party expression, by 
publicly endorsing a particular behavior, tends to make that behavior salient. If so, then we claim 
(4) that law is one form of third party expression capable of making salient a behavior and 
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thereby producing self-fulfilling expectations that it will occur. The last claim is the one we test 
in the experiments reported here. We explain each claim in turn. 
 
A. The Need for Coordination is Pervasive 
 Many theorists overlook the pervasiveness of coordination in social life. In a pure 
coordination game, two individuals each make some choice where each cares only about 
“matching” or coordinating herr choice with the other. For example, two people are trying to find 
each other and must choose between going to place A and going to place B. Or two drivers in a 
new society must decide whether to drive on the left or drive on the right. In general, the 
coordination problem is that one person’s best choice depends on what the second person does, 
but the second person’s best choice depends on what the first person does. In the pure 
coordination situation, the interests of both people are entirely common. Both people care only 
about matching their outcomes, such as both choosing A or both choosing the right side of the 
road. There is no conflict.. 
 If the need for coordination existed only in this pure form, it would not have much relevance 
to the social world. But in more complex situations, where motives conflict, there may also be a 
strong element of coordination. In other words, the world does not consist of only (1) situations 
of pure coordination and (2) situations of pure conflict, but also (3) mixed motive situations of 
conflict and coordination. For this reason, the need for coordination is socially pervasive 
(Schelling, 1960; Sugden 1986). 
 Many traffic situations illustrate this mix of conflict and coordination. For example, imagine 
two drivers approaching an intersection on perpendicular streets where each wishes to proceed 
first through the intersection; or two drivers traveling on the same road in opposite directions as 
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they approach a one-lane bridge that each wishes to use first; or two drivers merging lanes where 
each wishes to get ahead of the other. In each case, there is an obvious element of conflict 
because each wants to proceed ahead of the other. But there is also a common interest in 
coordinating to avoid certain outcomes. Most obviously, of the possible outcomes, each regards a 
collision of the two vehicles as the worst. For any but the most idiosyncratic driver, crashing is 
worse than letting the other proceed first. Each driver therefore has a common interest in 
coordinating to avoid a collision. It is also likely that the two drivers have a common interest in 
avoiding the outcome where both wait for the other to proceed. Not only does that waste time for 
each, but after they each realize that the other is also waiting, they must face the same situation 
again – deciding whether to proceed first or wait – which means they again risk the possibility of 
a collision. Thus, even though the drivers conflict over what is the best outcome, they still have a 
common interest in coordinating to avoid some outcomes –  the collision certainly, and possibly 
also the mutual wait.  
 Besides traffic, many kinds of disputes often have the same structure. For example, suppose 
two individuals want to sit in the same public area for a time and one wishes to smoke a cigarette 
and the other wishes not to be exposed to cigarette smoke. Or, two neighbors dispute the exact 
location of their property line and one may wish to plant a tree on the contested land while the 
other wants that no tree be planted. Or, some workers seek to force concessions from an 
employer by a strike or work slow-down, while other workers insist on working at the normal 
pace. In each case, it is possible that these disputes involve “pure” zero-sum conflict and no 
element of coordination. Those who think of coordination as an exotic and rare feature of the 
world no doubt see disputes in this light – that each side wants to get its way and regards the 
worst outcome as giving in to the other. 
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 But disputes will contain an element of coordination if there is any outcome the disputing 
parties jointly regard as the worst possible result. The outcome may be improbable, but if it 
exists, then the game is no longer one of pure conflict because the disputants share an interest in 
avoiding this bad result. The most pervasive reason is the potential for violence. However 
unlikely, illegal violence is always background risk of disputing. Much of the violence that 
occurs in ostensibly ordered societies involves individuals engaged in “self-help” remedies 
against someone who they regard as having infringed on their rights. (See, e.g., Black, 1983; 
Gibbs, 1989:35-37; Merry, 1981:175-86; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). So, if two sides in a protracted 
dispute each regard the outcome of violence as possible and the costs of violence as exceeding 
the costs of giving in to the other (which will be true if the costs of fighting are high relative to 
the value at stake), each may regard fighting as the worst possible outcome. This realization of a 
common interest does not end the dispute because each still prefers the other to give in without a 
fight. Each retains an interest in coordinating to avoid the fight even though each hopes to bluff 
the other into giving in by the threat of a fight. If so, then the situation is mixed motive – mutual 
conflict co-exists with the mutual desire to avoid violence. So an element of coordination can 
exist in disputes between strangers over smoking, between neighbors over land, and between co-
workers over a strike. 
 What is true of violence is true of other negative consequences of disputing. People may 
regard, for example, a heated shouting match or an exchange of profane insults as being the 
worst possible outcome of a dispute. This may be particularly true between people who know 
each other socially – such as the examples above involving neighbors and co-workers – because 
a heated exchange may damage or even terminate their relationship. Thus, where the risk of 
violence may be a particular concern in disputes with strangers (or individuals one knows to be 
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violent), a social breach may be a particular concern in disputes with a social acquaintance. In 
the latter case too, the individuals may each regard the worst possible outcome not as giving in, 
but as enduring the costs of unresolved disputes. What is true of violence and social disruption 
may also be true of litigation costs. If the costs of litigating are high relative to the stakes, the 
worst outcome for both disputants is to litigate, even though each hopes that the threat to litigate 
will cause the other party to give in. In all of these cases – violence, social disruption, and 
litigation – the interaction involves mixed motives; even when individuals prefer to get their way 
in the dispute, the element of coordination remains. 
 Among other possible examples, we conclude the section by discussing the most well 
known “game” in social science: the prisoners’ dilemma (“PD”). In the pure, one-shot PD game, 
there is no coordination problem because each player has a single best strategy (to defect), 
regardless of what the other individual does. In the iterated game, however, where two or more 
individuals interact for the indefinite future, it is possible that the lure of future returns from 
cooperation will cause the individuals to sustain cooperation (because any individual can 
sanction past defection with present and future defection). This iterated situation presents a 
mixed motive game because there is a mutual desire to avoid the all-defect outcome, even though 
each individual still prefers to defect while the other cooperates. By itself, this may create some 
room for third party expression to influence behavior at the very beginning of the interaction by 
“pointing to” mutual cooperation as the appropriate starting point.  
 The primary role for law, however, comes from a different point. All that is necessary to 
imbue a real world iterated PD with another powerful element of coordination is that there is 
more than one way to cooperate. (See Garrett & Weingast, 1993). As a mundane example, 
consider the problem of over-fishing in a village along a bay. The villagers might face a PD 
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situation because each prefers to be free to catch as many fish as possible, but to have others 
limit their catch to a sustainable amount. At the same time, each fisher may regard it as the worst 
outcome to be the only one to limit his fishing. If everyone is free to decide on their own, 
everyone may fish beyond a sustainable level, even though everyone would rather that everyone 
(including themselves) limited their fishing than to have no one do so. According to the 
conventional account, law may “solve” this “tragedy of the commons” by providing some 
enforceable fishing limits (which change the payoffs so the game is no longer a PD).  
What game theorists usually ignore in such examples, however, is that there is more than 
one possible solution. One might limit over-fishing, for example, by limiting the number of 
people allowed to fish (as by lottery or tradable licenses) or by limiting the number of fish any 
one person is allowed to catch. For the latter, one might proceed directly by specifying the 
quantity of fish a given person can catch per year, less directly by limiting the number of days a 
given person can fish per year, or very indirectly by limiting the kind of technology one can use 
in fishing. It could easily be the case that all residents would regard more than one of these 
regulations to be an improvement over the unregulated status quo. If so, the choice between these 
regulatory means is at least partly a matter of coordination. If fishers were all indifferent among 
the alternatives, they would face a pure coordination game. More likely, they disagree about 
which regulation is best, and we have the kind of mixed motive coordination problem discussed 
above: the parties mutually regard the status quo as worse than several regulatory alternatives 
and therefore have a common interest in agreeing on one regulatory scheme, but because they 
disagree as to which regulatory alternative is best, they may fail to coordinate on any of them and 
be left with the status quo. In general, the iterated PD game involves an important element of 
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coordination where there is more than one way to solve it, the people involved disagree about 
which way is best, but agree that it is better to solve the PD problem than to leave it unaddressed. 
 
B. Salience Produces Coordination 
 In situations requiring an element of coordination, anything that makes salient one 
behavioral means of coordinating tends to produce self-fulfilling expectations that this behavior 
will result. Decades ago, Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling (1960) first explained the 
significance of these “focal points” in solving coordination problems. The simplest examples 
involve pure coordination games. For example, suppose you ask two people to try to name the 
same positive whole number without communicating. Given the infinity of possible solutions, 
the odds of “matching” seem to be at or near zero, but in this situation most people select a 
number that seems to stand out from the rest – the number one. If you ask two people at what 
time of day they would try to meet each other during one day if they hadn’t scheduled a 
particular time, there again are many logical possibilities, but there is a tendency to select noon. 
Schelling said that these were “focal points” because some feature of the particular solution not 
captured by the formal structure of the situation nonetheless draws the attention of the 
individuals. Other research confirms that individuals do not just thoughtlessly choose the salient 
solution, but reason about what is likely to be mutually understood as the salient solution (Mehta 
et al., 1994). 
 Schelling asserts that what is true of the pure coordination game is also true of the mixed 
motive games involving conflict and coordination – that the salience of the outcome will tend to 
produce self-fulfilling expectations that this focal outcome will occur. We could imagine this 
point by introducing a slight degree of conflict in the above examples. Suppose that two 
 13 
individuals are told they will receive a significant monetary payoff if they “match” in naming a 
positive whole number (or time of day), and zero if they fail to match. But suppose that each is 
told that one individual – Player A – will receive $100 if they match on an odd number and $99 if 
they match on an even number, while Player B will receive $100 for an even numbered match 
and $99 for an odd numbered match. The conflict here is trivial compared to the coordination, so 
we should not expect it to matter. For the positive whole number, Player B will name the most 
salient number – one – and accept $99 rather than name a non-focal even number and risk 
getting nothing. For the time of day, Player A will name the salient time – noon – and accept $99 
rather than name a non-focal odd number and risk getting nothing. And though the size of the 
focal point effect is a contingent and empirical matter, there is no reason a priori to think that it 
disappears entirely as the magnitude of the conflict grows. So, even if an individual gets $100 
from one kind of match and only $10 from another, he may expect the other to play the salient 
solution and therefore prefer to play it himself, getting $10 rather than nothing. 
 We can say the same about the actual mixed motive games discussed above. Recall the 
simplest situation of two drivers in the pure coordination situation who must choose whether to 
drive on the left or right; here they will tend to select whichever side they believe is mutually 
salient. Similarly, two drivers in the mixed motive situations described above – such as two 
drivers merging into a single lane – will tend to choose the behavior that they regard as mutually 
salient. Each driver would like to proceed ahead of the other, but each wants to avoid a collision. 
If one solution is focal – e.g., the driver on the right proceeds first – then even the driver on the 
left disadvantaged by that solution will prefer it to the collision. Expecting the focal solution, the 
driver on the left will slow down and let the driver on the right merge first.  
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 According to the theory, the same point should apply to a dispute, if it involves a mixed 
motive situation. If the two disputants wish to avoid the cost of a fight or social breach, then the 
existence of a focal solution to the dispute will create self-fulfilling expectations that the 
individuals will choose it. For example, Schelling (1960) mentions “precedent” as one obvious 
reason that a particular solution is focal – it is the solution everyone knows was used in the past. 
If the context is a place and time in which non-smokers have always in the past deferred to 
smokers, then that is the salient solution. It is possible, of course, that the non-smoker in this 
sense has internalized a norm of deference to smokers, but Schelling’s point does not depend on 
that. Even if we imagine that the non-smoker is a visitor from a culture with very different 
customs, if he is aware of the local norm, and if the smoker knows he is aware of the local norm 
(or merely assumes he is), then the influence remains. The influence will be most powerful if the 
two individuals have what game theorists call “common knowledge” of the same past precedent 
(and no other precedent), meaning not only that each knows the local custom, but each knows 
that the other knows, each knows that the other knows the other knows, and so on. Because the 
non-smoker knows that the salient outcome is for him to defer and because he wishes to avoid 
possible violence or social breach, he defers. 
 
C. Third Party Expression Produces Salience 
 Precedent and custom are not the only features that make a particular solution salient. 
Schelling (1960) contended that third party expression can make a solution focal and thereby 
influence behavior. In a sense, the third party “constructs” a focal point merely by words or acts 
that draw attention to a particular outcome (see Garrett & Weingast, 1993). Most obviously, a 
third party can recommend or demand that the individuals coordinate in a particular way, and 
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thereby create self-fulfilling expectations that the recommended or demanded behavior will 
occur. 
 In a pure coordination game, the influence of a third party seems obvious. As an example, 
Schelling (1960) supposes that two people are accidentally separated from each other in a 
department store. Relocating each other is a coordination problem; they each share the common 
desire to go to the same place as the other. Although they will probably find each other 
eventually, they may waste a lot of time doing so. Schelling then imagines that the department 
store owner has posted prominent signs through the store stating something like “Lost parties 
should reunite at the fountain on the first floor.” If both people know each other to be literate, it 
is easy to imagine that this third party expression influences their behavior. If the sign is (or even 
might be) common knowledge, then it seems to give each person a reason to look for the other at 
the recommended place. Interestingly, this is not a theory captured by the dominant economic 
concern with sanctions because the department store is not threatening to sanction anyone who 
fails to follow its advice. Nor is the importance of salience captured by theories of authority or 
legitimacy. Even if the two shoppers do not perceive the department store owner as a legitimate 
authority figure, or even if they are in the store precisely to protest its illegitimacy (e.g., for its 
labor or environmental policies), the salience of the recommended meeting place gives them both 
a reason to go there. 
 But can third parties construct focal points in mixed games involving conflict as well as 
coordination? Certainly Schelling thought so, and he gave a compelling example in the traffic 
context, which we offer as a central metaphor for the focal point power. Suppose that the traffic 
light fails at some busy intersection and a bystander – not a police officer – steps into the 
intersection to direct traffic. Schelling conjectured that the bystander’s hand signals would 
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influence the drivers’ behavior. As two drivers approach from different streets, each prefers to 
proceed ahead of the other, though each regards the worst outcome as a collision. If the drivers 
can both see (and see that the other sees; in short, have common knowledge that) the bystander 
motioning one driver to stop and the other to proceed, then the driver who is told to stop will 
now have much more reason to fear that the other driver will proceed. Given that expectation, his 
best response is to stop, which is to comply with the third party’s expression. Again, the third 
party appears to wield behavioral influence even without possessing legitimate authority and 
without threatening sanctions. Certainly, those two elements would likely increase the degree of 
compliance with the bystander’s signals, but we should not predict the complete absence of 
compliance even if the bystander lacks any legitimate authority or sanctioning ability. 
 
 D. Law is a Form of Third Party Expression for Constructing Focal Points 
Whether the source of law is a legislature, a judicial opinion, an executive official or an 
administrative agency, a legal rule expresses how to resolve a conflict. Law is therefore a form of 
“third party expression” pointing to particular behavior. If the situation the law addresses 
includes an element of coordination, if the law is sufficiently clear and public, and if there are no 
other competing focal points, the state’s public declaration of a legal rule should influence 
behavior by constructing a focal point. A number of theorists have posited that legal rules thus 
create the salience necessary to influence behavior in any mixed motive situation (Cooter, 1998; 
Garrett & Weingast, 1993; Ginsburg & McAdams, 2004; Hardin, 1989; Hay & Shleifer, 1998; 
)McAdams & Nadler 2005; McAdams 2005; E. Posner, 2000). This final claim is what we tested 
in our contextualized experiments discussed below. 
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 We note however that the necessary conditions for this effect do not always hold: Law may 
address situations of pure conflict, where there is not even the slightest element of coordination. 
Or, even if there is an element of coordination, the publicity of the law often depends largely on 
media coverage, which does not always exist. Law cannot create a focal point if the content of 
the law is generally unknown. Even if publicized, the content of the law is often unclear, 
especially to non-lawyers. Law cannot align expectations unless it is sufficiently clear that most 
individuals have the same interpretation of it. Finally, even if the law enjoys clarity, it may face 
strong competition from other factors that make a particular outcome salient. Most commonly, 
the law might attempt to change an existing norm that, as precedent for past behavior, continues 
to make salient the behavior that adheres to the norm. 
 Nevertheless, the necessary conditions sometimes do hold. Indeed, we might see law as 
being the form of third party expression for which these conditions are most likely to hold. First, 
law addresses disputes, which, as we explained above, often contain an element of coordination 
(when each side often regards the worst outcome as some form of destructive conflict). Second, 
there is often great publicity to legal rules either from media coverage of the enactment of a new 
statute or from direct government advertising of a new rule (by public service announcements or 
the posting of signs). Third, though many laws are opaque, some are fairly simple, e.g., the right-
of-way goes to the driver with the green light, the landowner owns minerals buried under the 
surface of (and tree branches hanging over the surface of) his property, or no smoking in 
restaurants. Finally, law often avoids having to compete with other stronger focal points, as 
where expectations are not fully settled.  Thus, to test the focal effect of law in the two 
experiments described below, we created narratives that involved a dispute containing an 
element of coordination with clearly stated legally proscribed outcomes and no competing focal 
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point. As we describe in detail below, in this context we found strong evidence that law exerts a 
focal influence on behavior. 
 
 
II. Experiment 1: The Cat Dispute 
 
A. Background: The Hawk/Dove Game 
 
So far, we have described a class of “mixed motive” games, involving conflict and 
coordination, but not identified any specific games. There are many possibilities, but here we 
will introduce the Hawk/Dove (“HD”) game as a means of modeling a property dispute. In this 
game, each person chooses between an aggressive strategy – here, to insist on disputed property 
(“Hawk”) – and a passive strategy – to yield to the other claimant (“Dove”). In HD, each person 
most prefers playing Hawk against the other person’s Dove; at the same time, each person least 
prefers playing Hawk against the other person’s Hawk. In fact, if a person expects the other 
person to play Hawk, then she prefers to play Dove in response. Translated into the property 
example, each claimant would most prefer to use the land as she wishes while the other claimant 
acquiesces. But if the first claimant knows that the second one will choose to insist, then the first 
would prefer to defer rather than have a fight. 
We illustrate these situations with the 2X2 table in Figure 1. Each box represents the 
outcome that will result for both individuals depending on the strategies they (simultaneously) 
choose. For each of the four outcomes, we list a “payoff” for Individual 1 in the lower left corner 
and a payoff for Individual 2 in the upper right corner. The particular numbers aren’t important, 
but their relative size captures the basic structure of the interaction, which is that, for each 
individual: the best outcome is to play Hawk against the other’s Dove; the second best outcome 
is to play Dove against the other’s Dove; third best is to play Dove against Hawk; and worst of 
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all is to play Hawk against Hawk. So the two individuals have conflicting interests over the 
choice between Hawk/Dove or Dove/Hawk (each also preferring one of these to Dove/Dove), 
but a common interest in avoiding Hawk/Hawk. 
      ______________________________ 
         Figure 1 about here 
______________________________ 
We set out to answer the question of whether the forms of third party expression used in 
our previous work (i.e., spinner, randomly selected leader, and leader selected via merit) 
(McAdams & Nadler 2005) really model law. In the first experiment reported here, we 
embedded the HD game into a vignette about a dispute, rather than using the context-less 2 x 2 
normal form game as we did in our previous study. Specifically, participants imagined 
themselves in a property dispute about a cat, which was carefully structured -- both in terms of 
the qualitative description of the possible outcomes, and in terms of the quantitative payoffs -- as 
a HD game. 
 We started from the premise that in a mixed motive coordination game like HD, when the 
law makes one outcome salient to disputants, it influences disputants to choose that outcome for 
a number of possible reasons, including: (i) fear of sanctions; (ii) perceived legitimacy of law; 
and (iii) law’s ability to create a focal point in a coordination situation involving multiple 
equilibria. In our previous work involving a stylized normal form game (McAdams & Nadler 
2005), we were able to separate out the effect of sanctions and legitimacy from the focal point 
effect. We partitioned out the effect of sanctions simply by imposing no penalty or change in 
payoffs as a result of failure to comply with the third party expression. We partitioned out the 
effect of perceived legitimacy of the law by simply not invoking law or legal processes at all in 
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the third party expression. Instead, the third party expression took the form of a leader (either 
randomly selected or selected via a process involving merit) or of an explicitly random spinner. 
 When the game is embedded in a social context, separating out the effects of sanctions is 
still easy. We merely hold constant the payoffs in the game, so there is no greater loss from any 
failure to comply with the third party expression. Partitioning out the effect of legitimacy, 
however, is extremely difficult once any mention of “law” is made. To solve this problem, we 
used as a comparison a single equilibrium game (a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (“PD”) game), 
where legitimacy may operate but law does not function as a focal point because there is only 
one equilibrium (because each player selects the one strategy that is best no matter what strategy 
the other selects). We thus compared the effect of law in a single equilibrium PD game with the 
effect of law in a multiple equilibrium HD game, where both legitimacy and the focal point 
effect might operate simultaneously. By comparing the joint effect of legitimacy and focal point 
in HD to the sole effect of legitimacy in PD, we can estimate the magnitude of the focal point 
effect. 
 
  B. Design 
 In the experiment, participants imagined themselves in a dispute about ownership of a cat. 
Each disputant simultaneously made a decision about whether to insist on owning the cat 
(“Insist”), or defer to the other disputant’s claim to the cat (“Give In”). We manipulated the 
effect of law by telling participants that the law favors the other (imagined) party or by 
mentioning nothing of the law. The No Law condition therefore serves as a baseline measure of 
the participant’s likelihood of Giving In to the other party’s claim to the cat. In the Law 
condition participants are told that the other disputant is the rightful owner. Therefore if law 
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influences the participant’s decision, it should have the effect of decreasing the likelihood that 
the participant will Insist on her claim to the cat. At the same time, we partitioned out the effects 
of legitimacy of law by a difference in differences approach: comparing the effect of law in HD 
with the effect of law in PD, as described earlier. If the law influences behavior by functioning as 
a focal point, we would expect to observe a stronger effect of law in HD (attributable to both 
legitimacy and the focal point effect) than in PD (attributable only to perceived legitimacy).  
We measure the effect of law by the rate of Insisting. In this experiment, when law is 
mentioned, it says that the other disputant is the rightful owner. Therefore, the strategy consistent 
with the requirements of the law is to Give In to the claim of the other party; conversely the 
strategy inconsistent with law is to Insist.  We can compute the effect of legitimacy (L) by 
subtracting the rate of Insisting in the PD game where there is law (Ipdl ) from the rate of Insisting 
in the PD game where there is no law (Ipdn), as follows: 
L = Ipdn – Ipdl  
We can then compute the effect of the focal point (F) by subtracting the effect of legitimacy from 
the difference in rates of compliance between Law (Ihdl) and No Law(Ihdn) in the HD game as 
follows: 
F = (Ihdn – Ihdl) – L  
Thus, the extent to which the effect of law is greater in HD than in PD is the extent to which the 
law is functioning as a focal point to coordinate behavior. 
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C. Participants  
 Participants were invited to participate via an email message sent to individuals who had 
previously registered as a volunteer to participate in web-based research.1 The email message 
included a URL for a survey hosted on the internet. Participants were offered an incentive for 
participation in the form of a random draw to receive a gift certificate from an online retailer. 
Participants were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying 
information would not be collected. 
 An email message was sent to 3200 people, inviting them to participate. Of these, 271 
messages were returned as undeliverable, leaving 2929 valid addresses remaining. Of these, 490 
people completed the survey. Toward the beginning of the survey, three questions were designed 
to test basic understanding of the materials; 129 people failed to correctly answer at least one of 
these three questions, so their responses were excluded from the results, leaving a final sample 
size of 361. Of these, 65% were female, and 89% were white. The participants’ mean age was 40 
years.2 
 
 D.   Materials and Procedure 
 This experiment had a 2 (Game: Hawk Dove, Prisoner’s Dilemma) x 2 (Focal Point: Law, 
No Law) between-subjects design. Participants read a vignette in which they imagined 
themselves involved in a property dispute. Afterwards, they made a decision about what strategy 
they would use in the dispute: Insist or Give In. After making their decision about the dispute, 
participants answered a question regarding their reason for their decision.  
                                                 
1
 Participant recruitment was managed by the StudyResponse Project, hosted by the School of Information Studies at 
Syracuse University, at http://www.studyresponse.com. 
2
 In this respect, the subject pool provides another distinction from our prior experiment, (McAdams & Nadler 
2005), where the subjects were all undergraduates. 
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 In designing the experiment, we faced a difficulty. We wanted to motivate the subjects by 
creating a high stakes dispute where neither party would resort to the courts (so that the legal rule 
would not matter as a prediction for what outcome a court would compel via legal sanctions). If, 
however, the apparent stakes were high in monetary terms then it might seem implausible that 
neither party would resort to the courts. We therefore sought to create a dispute over something 
valuable in non-monetary terms, and so our vignette involved a pet. Participants read a story 
involving a dispute over ownership of a cat. In the vignette, the participant was asked to imagine 
she adopted a young kitten (“Whiskers”) but that soon another person (Morgan) innocently came 
into possession of the same cat (renamed “Boots”) by purchasing it at the local farmer’s market 
after it had been stolen. Each party (the participant and Morgan) maintains that she is the rightful 
owner of the cat. The cat was now being cared for by a neutral third party (Francis), who has 
given the disputants a limited amount of time to simultaneously make a decision about the final 
disposition of the cat. At the conclusion of the vignette, the participant must choose between 
insisting on having her way and taking possession of the cat, or deferring to Morgan and 
permitting Morgan to take possession of the cat. Participants are informed that Morgan must 
simultaneously make the same decision. 
 In the No Law condition, participants were told that the courts in their state have never 
decided who would own the cat in this kind of circumstance, and that no one knows how the 
courts would decide the issue. In the Law condition, participants learned that both parties know 
for certain that the law (based on an old court case) says that Morgan now owns the cat because 
Morgan purchased it in good faith not knowing it had been stolen. However, the cost of a 
lawsuit, even in small claims court, is far too expensive for both parties. In both the Law and No 
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Law conditions, participants are informed that the police and courts will take no action regarding 
this dispute.  
 Prior to making a decision, participants were informed of the consequences of each 
combination of options available to them and to Morgan. This information is given in two types 
of formats: narrative and monetary. The narrative information was explained in detail in the text 
of the vignette, and was also summarized in a table alongside the monetary consequences. The 
monetary consequences were explained in the vignette as follows: “Both of you must decide 
simultaneously, by writing down your final decision – Insist or Give In – without knowing what 
the other’s decision will be. After that the results indicated below will occur. Because you and 
Morgan love the cat so much, neither could really place a dollar value on how much the cat 
means to you. Nevertheless, if forced to place a valuation on the consequences of their choices, 
you would do it like this:” Participants saw the table shown in Table 1, except that the second 
row (You: Insist; Morgan: Insists) contained only one set of results, depending on whether the 
participant was assigned to the HD or PD condition (the labels in italics indicating condition 
were also omitted for participants). In the HD condition, the consequence of both parties 
Insisting is that Francis gives the cat to a shelter in a far away, undisclosed location, where it will 
be adopted by an unknown person, or maybe even destroyed. In the PD condition, the 
consequence of both parties Insisting is that Francis gives the cat to a responsible person in a far 
away, undisclosed location. 
______________________________ 
  
Table 1 about here 
______________________________ 
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 It is important to note that both the narrative and monetary consequences are 
identical in the HD and PD game conditions with the exception of one combination of 
options – where both parties insist, as depicted in Table 1. This is the defining difference 
between the structure of the HD game and the structure of the PD game. Note that in the 
PD game, the worst outcome for each party is when he or she decides to Give In and the 
other party decides to Insist; in this particular PD game, playing Give In against Insist 
results in $0. By contrast, the worst outcome in the HD game occurs when both parties 
play Insist, which in this HD game results in a LOSS of $200 for each party. As a result, 
in the PD game the best strategy is to Insist because, no matter what the counterpart does, 
Insists or Gives In, Insisting produces the higher payoff. By contrast, this is not true in 
the HD game. Rather, in the HD game the best strategy depends on what the counterpart 
will do. If the counterpart will Insist, then one is better off Giving In. But if the 
counterpart will Give In, one is better off Insisting. Because of this, there are two pure 
strategy equilibria in the HD game: the first party Insists and the second Gives In; or the 
first party Gives In and the second Insists.  
 We hypothesized that the effect of Law would be greater in the HD game than in the 
PD game. Recall that in the Law condition, participants learn that the law says the other 
party is entitled to keep the cat. Therefore, if a participant decided to make her decision 
based on what the law says, she would decide to Give In to the other party, rather than 
Insist. In the PD game, there is only one reason that the law would influence participants’ 
behavior: because it is viewed as legitimate and worthy of obedience, despite the absence 
of sanctions. But in the HD game, the law has two sources of potential influence: 
legitimacy as in the PD game and also the ability of the law to create a focal point. 
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Participants playing the HD game who learn that the law says the other party is entitled to 
keep the cat might infer that Morgan will take this into account and decide to Insist; given 
this, the clear choice is to Give In so as to avoid the Hawk-Hawk outcome. In this way, 
we can test the ability of Law to create a focal point in the HD game, over and above its 
ability to gain compliance via its perceived legitimacy. To test this, we examine whether 
the effect of Law is greater in HD than in PD.  
 
 E. Pilot Data 
 We wanted to ensure that respondents would perceive the payoff structures of the 
two games in the expected way. The monetary payoffs clearly correspond to the ordinal 
structure of the two games, but whether the respondents perceive the verbal descriptions 
as corresponding to the ordinal structure of the respective games is an open question. To 
explore this, we collected data on the perceived structure of the verbal descriptions of the 
games in Table 1. Using a separate sample of 195 participants drawn from the same 
population as the main experiment, we randomly assigned pilot respondents to conditions 
as described above and presented each pilot respondent with the experimental materials, 
modified as follows. The description of consequences for the assigned game (either HD 
or PD), contained the verbal descriptions, but not the monetary equivalents depicted in 
Table 1. We asked each pilot respondent to rate the desirability of each outcome 
according to their own personal preference (1-Terrible; 7-Great).  
 Results indicated that, in the HD game, the outcome with the lowest mean rating was 
Insist/Insist (“You insist and Morgan insists”; M=1.32), as we had intended. The outcome 
with the highest mean rating was Insist/GiveIn (“You insist and Morgan gives in”)(6.38), 
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also as expected. Most crucially, the mean rating for Insist/GiveIn (“You insist and 
Morgan gives in”) (M=6.38) was significantly higher than the mean rating for 
GiveIn/GiveIn (“You give in and Morgan gives in”)(M=4.38), Wilcoxon signed-rank z = 
6.77; p<.001.  Equally as crucial, the mean rating for GiveIn/Insist (“You give in and 
Morgan insists”) (M=2.74) was significantly greater than the mean rating for Insist/Insist 
(You insist and Morgan insists”) (M=1.32), Wilcoxon signed-rank z = -7.07; p<.001.   
 These responses ensure that the vast majority of respondents were playing the HD 
game we intended. If a respondent expected Morgan to insist, then his or her best choice 
is to give in, thus avoiding what is perceived to be the worst outcome. If a respondent 
expected Morgan to give in, then his or her best choice is to insist, thus producing what is 
perceived as the best outcome (instead of giving in and producing the second or third best 
outcome). These results confirm that the verbal descriptions given for HD are perceived 
by respondents in a way that correspond to the ordinal structure of the payoffs of the 
game. Respondents believe that their best decision depends on what they expect the other 
player to do, which is the situation where the focal effect can operate. 
 In the PD game, the outcomes with the highest mean rating was Insist/GiveIn (“You 
insist and Morgan gives in”)(M=6.64), as expected. Crucially, Insist/GivenIn was rated 
significantly higher than GiveIn/GiveIn (M=4.11), Wilcoxon sign-rank z = 7.22, p<.001. 
Unexpectedly, Insist/Insist (“You insist and Morgan insists”)(M=2.18) and GiveIn/Insist 
(“You give in and Morgan insists”) (M=2.25) were ranked equally as the worst outcome, 
Wilcoxon sign-rank z = -0.53, p=.59.  If a respondent expected Morgan to give in, then 
we intend that his or her best choice is to insist, and this is borne out in the perceptions of 
the verbal descriptions. If a respondent expected Morgan to insist, then we intend that his 
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or her best choice is to insist; however, the perceptions of the verbal descriptions do not 
reflect this ordering as a clear preference for respondents. 
 Overall, with one exception, these results confirm that our respondents perceived our 
verbal descriptions in a way that corresponds to the ordinal structure of the payoffs of the 
game. One subset of responses indicates no clear preference, based on the verbal 
descriptions alone, regarding how to best respond to the opponent’s decision to insist in 
PD. The presence of this subset of responses in the data means that the hypothesized 
effects will be more difficult to detect than if this subset were absent (i.e., the data will be 
more noisy). This difficulty is potentially offset (at least partially) by the relatively large 
sample size (N=361) of Experiment 1. There is no reason to believe, however, that the 
presence of this subset of responses will bias the responses toward the hypothesized 
results; to the contrary, this ambiguity in the perception of the verbal descriptions may 
bias the results away from our hypothesis. This is because 21.8% of the pilot study 
respondents in the PD condition perceived the verbal descriptions in such a way as to 
create a multiple equilibrium game. That is, members of this subgroup indicated that they 
would prefer to Give In if the other party Insists, but at the same time would prefer to 
Insist if the other party gives in. These individuals need to coordinate their actions and 
therefore experienced the PD condition not as an actual PD game, but as a game like HD, 
in which the law can influence behavior by creating a focal point. If some respondents in 
PD condition are influenced by the focal effect of law, that will reduce the difference we 
hope to find between legal compliance levels in the HD and PD conditions. 
    In short, the pilot data indicate that respondents perceive the verbal descriptions as 
accurately reflecting the underlying ordinal structure of the HD game. Perceptions of the 
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verbal descriptions in the PD game are largely but not entirely as we intended; to the 
extent there is lack of clarity, however, it biases results away from our hypothesis. In 
Experiment 1, we coupled the verbal descriptions with the monetary equivalents to 
enforce the ordinal payoff definitions PD and HD, respectively. We theorized that 
appending the monetary equivalents to the verbal descriptions would help to reinforce the 
underlying ordinal structure of the PD game. 
 
F. Results 
 
1. Effect of Game and Focal Point on Insist Rate 
 
 Our primary dependent measure was the rate of Insisting, which we predicted would 
decrease as the effect of law increases. We first tested the effect of law on the likelihood 
of Insisting in the PD game. Any difference in the Law and No Law observed here would 
be attributable to the perceived legitimacy of law. In fact, the mean Insist rate between 
participants in the Law and No Law conditions in the PD game was virtually identical 
(64% v. 66%), and not surprisingly, this comparison is not statistically significant (χ2(1) 
= 0.041; p = .84). By contrast, there was a significant difference in the mean Insist rate 
between participants in the Law (27%) and No Law (44%) conditions playing the HD 
game; this difference is statistically significant (χ2(1) = 5.62; p <.05). Figure 2 depicts 
these differences. Though there appears to have been no effect derived from the 
perceived legitimacy of law,3 the results suggest that the focal point effect of law reduced 
the Insist rate from 44% to 27%. We ran a logistic regression analysis, where the binary 
dependent variable was Insist/Give In. The main effect of Game (HD, PD) was 
                                                 
3
 Of course, we are not claiming that the failure to find a legitimacy effect in this experiment means there is none 
generally. We intentionally created a context in which we thought the law would have very little legitimacy, so as to 
ensure that we would have scope for the focal point effect to operate. 
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statistically significant (Wald χ2(1) = 31.9; p<.001), but the main effect of Law (Wald 
χ
2(1)=3.37; p=.066) and the interaction term (Game x Law) (Wald χ2(1)=2.42; p=.12)  
fell shy of conventional levels of statistical significance, despite the clear pattern that 
emerges in the chart in Figure 3. We attribute this failure to detect these differences to 
insufficient statistical power required by the logistic regression model. 
______________________________ 
          Figure 2 about here 
______________________________ 
 
2. Reasons for Decision 
Participants were also asked to choose one from among the following reasons for why they 
chose to Insist or Give In. These were:  
“I made the choice that I thought was deserved” [deserved] 
“I made a rational calculation about the choice that was most likely to result in the best 
outcome” [best outcome] 
“I felt I needed to do what was best for Boots/Whiskers” [best for cat] 
“None of the above comes close to describing my reasons” [none of the above] 
 
 The results are illustrated in Figure 3 below. Note that participants who said that they tried 
to rationally calculate the best outcome overall (N = 83) did exactly as we predicted, in that the 
difference between Law and No Law is bigger in HD than in PD (in the second column labeled 
‘best outcome’). Among participants who gave rational calculation to the best outcome as their 
reason, the overall rate of Insisting was fairly low, and in all conditions within this group, the 
mean Insist rate was always less than 40%.  
 Participants who said their decision was based on placing the cat's interests first (N = 143) 
also did exactly as we predicted, in that Law reduced the Insist rate in HD more than it did in PD 
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(depicted in the third column, labeled ‘best for cat’). Among these respondents, the rate of 
insisting was extremely low overall. Note that the lowest mean insist rate by far was among 
respondents who reported placing the cat’s interest first who were in the HD/Law condition, 
where there was a possibility that the cat could be destroyed. In HD for this subgroup, Law 
apparently made the focal point of Participant-Give In / Morgan Insist more salient than in the 
No Law condition. We take this as a vindication of the theory because it demonstrates that the 
focal effect is most clear when the costs of “fighting" are high. Recall that we selected a cat 
because we wanted subjects to perceive simultaneously that there was much at stake even though 
the parties would not resort to the courts. There was, however, a risk that some subjects would 
not care much about cats. That the same results emerge in this subgroup of respondents provides 
good evidence for the theory. 
______________________________ 
          Figure 3 about here 
______________________________ 
Consider next the participants who said they made their decision based on what was deserved 
(N = 97). Remarkably, these participants appear to have paid virtually no attention to law at all, 
and were unmoved by the dire consequences (for the cat) of the Hawk-Hawk outcome in the HD 
game. Those moved by desert/fairness appear to have simply chosen Insist no matter what 
because they thought they deserved the cat (i.e., they owned it first, etc). Here the Insist rate was 
close to 100% over both Game conditions and both Focal Point conditions. For this group, it 
appears that law can influence their behavior, if at all, only through legal sanctions and/or legal 
legitimacy. 
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 The "Other" category (N = 38) is more difficult to interpret because the cell sizes are very 
small (N ranges from 2 to 15 in each of these four cells). It appears, however, that this group also 
behaves as predicted but it is impossible to say why, given that we have little information about 
their self-reported reasoning. Nearly all of them chose Insist, except in the HD/Law condition, 
which is very much consistent with our hypotheses. The difference between "Other" on the one 
hand and "Best Outcome"/"Best for Cat" on the other, is that the "Others” appear to have little 
hesitation in choosing to Insist virtually all the time. 
 
III. Experiment 2: The Contract Dispute 
 
We conducted a second experiment because we sought to replicate the findings of the first 
experiment and to establish the generality of the findings along several dimensions: the factual 
context, the legal context, and the game context. First, we wished to show that the results 
generalize outside of the factual context of one particular dispute about a cat. In the second 
experiment, we used the context of a commercial transaction. Second, by moving to a 
commercial transaction we also changed the legal context, not only moving from property to 
contract, but also moving from a context where law provides a mandatory rule (of ownership) to 
a context where law supplies merely a default rule (of contract damages). Finally, we changed 
the game context, moving from a Hawk/Dove game to a Battle of the Sexes game, as described 
below. In so doing, we seek to show that law can work expressively by creating a focal point in 
any situation in which it is important to coordinate with the other party.  
The particular Hawk-Dove game we used in Experiment 1 is merely one strategic situation in 
which it is extremely useful to be able to predict what the other party is going to do, so as to 
coordinate one’s behavior with the other. Another such situation is the so-called Battle of the 
Sexes game, which we employed in the second experiment to test the focal point theory of 
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expressive law. Battle of the Sexes is named after an early illustration in which a couple wants to 
go out together, each has a different preference about where to go, and both would rather go to 
the same place than different ones. This game models any situation in which each player values 
coordinating, but each player prefers a way of coordinating that is different from that favored by 
the other. Such conflict arises in certain disputes, specifically those in which there is no realistic 
possibility of a settlement that divides the gains or losses equally between the parties. For example, 
two siblings may dispute over ownership of a family heirloom, where time-sharing is impractical and 
neither can afford a side payment to the other that equalizes the gain. Or divorcing parents may each 
prefer to obtain custody over their child in circumstances where equal joint custody is logistically 
unworkable. Law often addresses such cases. 
In Experiment 2, we designed a hypothetical contract negotiation so that in one condition 
it had the structure of a Battle of the Sexes game. In this situation, each party had a different 
preference for a damages remedy – one prefers a profit remedy and one prefers an out-of-pocket 
loss remedy. However, like the couple who is trying to coordinate going on a date, each party to 
the contract dispute prefers to coordinate on some remedy, rather than having the negotiations 
break down and ending up with no contract at all.  
We hypothesized that even the weakest kind of law – a default rule – could work as a 
focal point. A default rule merely states the rule that will control if the parties to the contract do 
not specify a different rule in their agreement. By definition then, default rules are not binding 
and impose no sanctions. Nonetheless, an experimental literature finds that default rules 
influence the behavior of negotiating parties in that the party favored by the default rule tends to 
gain more of the available contractual surplus (See Korobkin 1998a:1626-27, 1998b:675-76; 
Schwab 1988:254-56). The influence of default rules on behavior in contractual negotiations is 
partly a manifestation of the endowment effect – generally, people are reluctant to part with 
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commodities they own (Kahneman, et al. 1991; Rachlinski & Jourden, 1998). Legitimacy 
theories might also explain this effect, but we nonetheless reasoned that a default rule, by 
pointing to a particular outcome, could influence behavior independent of legitimacy (or 
endowment) by creating a focal point that would help each party predict what the other will do. 
Our hypothesis, then, differs from the more general prediction derived from the endowment 
effect and/or the status quo bias, which would posit people show a general preference for 
contract default rules, regardless of the structure of the underlying game. By contrast, we predict 
that the preference for contract default rules will be strongest in a situation involving 
coordination, because the default rule will make focal one remedy around which parties can 
coordinate. 
For example, suppose that contract law allows the parties to specify a remedy, but the 
default remedy is lost profits (“the profit remedy”). In this case, the party who prefers the profit 
remedy is happy to stick with the default rule. The party who prefers an out-of-pocket remedy is 
not so happy to stick with the default rule, but must take into consideration that the other party 
might be more likely to expect and insist on a profit remedy simply because the profit remedy is 
also the default rule. In the experiment we intentionally (and somewhat artificially) set up the 
situation so that after an exhausting period of negotiation, the parties have agreed that they must 
simultaneously and independently indicate a single remedy that they require to be incorporated 
into the contract. If their decisions match, they have a contract. If their decisions do not match, 
there is no contract. We hypothesized that the presence of a default rule can act as a focal point 
to help parties coordinate on a contract. 
The design of Experiment 2 is therefore much like that of Experiment 1, with one key 
difference. As in the first experiment, we used a Prisoner’s Dilemma game as a control, because 
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(in its one-shot form) it has only one pure strategy equilibrium and therefore does not give rise to 
the opportunity to coordinate behavior. As in the first experiment, we then compared the results 
of the PD game with the results from a game involving coordination. The effect of the law’s 
legitimacy (and endowment effect) should arise in the PD game; we can then attribute any 
additional compliance in the coordination situation to the focal point effect.  The one difference 
from Experiment 1 is that the coordination game there was HD, whereas here it is BOS. In 
Experiment 1, our main result was to show that the strategy suggested by law was followed more 
in the coordination game than in the PD game, which we attribute to law’s focal effect. In 
Experiment 2, with a similar design, we also predict that law will have a greater influence in the 
coordination game, compared to the PD game. 
 
A.   Participants and Design 
Participants were invited to participate via an email message sent to law students enrolled 
at a law school in the midwestern United States. The email message included a URL to a survey 
hosted on the internet. Participants were offered an incentive for participation in the form of a 
random draw to receive a $40 gift certificate from an online retailer. Participants were assured 
that their responses would remain anonymous.  
Ninety-two participants completed the survey. We did not collect demographic data (e.g., 
age, sex) in this experiment. The experimental design was identical to that of the first 
experiment, except that the game of interest was a Battle of the Sexes game, rather than a Hawk 
Dove game. Specifically, this experiment had a 2 (Game: BOS, PD) x 2 (Focal Point: Law, No 
Law) between-subjects design. Participants read a vignette in which they imagined themselves 
 36 
involved in a contract negotiation. Afterwards, they made a decision about what strategy they 
would use in the dispute: Insist or Give In. 
 
 B.   Materials and Procedure 
 Participants read a story involving a contract negotiation. In the vignette, the participant was 
asked to imagine she and the other party, George, has settled on all of the terms of the contract 
except for those defining the remedy in the event of breach. The parties have narrowed the 
possibilities to two possible remedy terms: (1) a profit remedy, in which the breaching party pays 
the other party the profit that the other would have made had the contract been performed; or (2) 
an out-of-pocket loss remedy, in which the breaching party pays the other party the out of pocket 
losses incurred as a result of entering into the contract.  
Participants learned that the parties have been negotiating for a long time and have agreed 
to all terms except for the remedy. In all conditions, the participant prefers Remedy 2 (out of 
pocket) but that George prefers Remedy 1 (profit). In the No Law condition, the law allows 
parties to specify either remedy, but that if the parties disagree over the remedy, they will have 
no contract.4 By contrast, in the Law condition, the law allows parties to specify either remedy, 
but if they reach agreement on all terms without specifying a remedy (and without agreeing in 
negotiations not to have a contract unless they agree to a remedy), then the default rule will 
supply the remedy term; in this jurisdiction, the default rule provides for remedy (1). 
In the BOS condition, participants were told that even though their first choice is remedy 
(2) they would much rather have a contract with remedy (1) than have no contract at all. 
                                                 
4
 Technically then, there is a legal rule in the “No Law” condition, a rule that says that there is no contract under 
these circumstances unless the parties explicitly agree on the breach remedy. But this rule treats all breach remedies 
equal and cannot possibly make one of them a focal point. Thus, by “No Law,” here we mean that there is no legal 
rule that could create a focal point by favoring one remedy over another.   
 37 
Similarly, they were told that even though George’s first choice is remedy (1), he would rather 
have a contract with remedy (2) than no contract at all. This structure of preferences creates a 
BOS game where one’s best choice depends on what the other party’s choice is and there are two 
equilibria (each a contract with a different remedy provision).  
In the PD condition, participants were told that while their first choice is remedy (2), they 
would rather have no contract than a contract with remedy (1). Similarly they were told that 
George’s first choice is remedy (1) but he would rather have no contract than a contract with 
remedy (2). This structure of preferences creates a PD game, where one’s best choice is to Insist 
on one’s preferred remedy no matter what the other party does (and the only equilibrium is no 
contract). Participants in both conditions were informed that each party knows all of the 
information. This information is summarized in Table 2. 
______________________________ 
         Table 2 about here 
______________________________ 
 
Participants were therefore randomly assigned to one of the four following conditions: 
BOS/No Law; BOS/Law; PD/No Law; PD/Law. After being informed of the law and the parties’ 
preferences, participants were told that neither party wants to leave the contract silent on the 
remedy issue, that both are tired of negotiating, and that both parties decided to limit further 
efforts to reach a contract. There will be one last round of negotiations during which each party 
will simultaneously place in an envelope their final breach remedy proposal, without seeing what 
the other is doing. If both propose remedy (1) then there will be a contract with remedy (1); if 
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both propose remedy (2) then there will be a contract with remedy (2); if one party proposes 
remedy (1) and the other party proposes remedy (2), there is no contract. 
As in the first experiment, we hypothesized that the effect of Law would be greater in 
BOS than in PD. Recall that there is only one pure strategy equilibrium in the PD game. In the 
PD game used in this experiment, each party would prefer no contract than a contract with their 
non-preferred remedy.  When participants learn that the legal default rule is their non-preferred 
remedy (Remedy 1), they should ignore the default and still choose their preferred remedy 
(Remedy 2) in the PD game. If George chooses Remedy 2 also, then the result will be a contract 
with the participant’s preferred remedy. If George chooses Remedy 1, then there is no contract, 
but this is preferable to a contract with Remedy 1. 
By contrast, the choice is not so simple in the BOS game, because both parties prefer a 
contract, even one with their non-preferred remedy, to no contract at all. Therefore, it is crucial 
to try to predict which remedy the other party will choose. If George will choose Remedy 1, then 
it is best for the participant to choose Remedy 1 also. But if George will choose Remedy 2, then 
it is best for the participant to do likewise. In the absence of any guidance, the participant must 
simply guess at which remedy George will choose. But the presence of a legal default rule might 
help the participant predict George’s behavior. Here, the legal default rule is the participant’s 
non-preferred remedy (Remedy 1). This remedy is not binding, and the parties know that they 
are free to contract around this. But in the absence of an agreed remedy, the participant might 
reason that George will choose Remedy 1 because that is the legal default rule. In this sense, the 
law provides a non-binding message that potentially coordinates behavior. Based on the above 
reasoning, we predict that the presence of law will have a greater effect in the BOS game than in 
the PD game. 
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C.   Results 
As in the first experiment, the dependent measure of interest was the percentage of 
respondents who Insisted on their preferred outcome (here, Remedy 2).  A logistic regression 
analysis showed a significant Game x Law interaction (Wald χ2(1) = 4.41; p < .05).  We first 
tested the effect of law on the likelihood of Insisting in the PD game. There was no statistically 
significant difference in the mean Insist rate between participants in the Law and No Law 
conditions in the PD game: 90% of participants in the No Law (PD) condition Insisted on 
Remedy 2, and 78% of participants in the Law (PD) condition insisted on Remedy 2 (χ2(1) = 
1.35; p = .25).5 By contrast, there was a statistically significant difference in the mean Insist rate 
between participants in the Law (42%) and No Law (72%) conditions playing the BOS game 
(χ2(1) = 3.99; p > .05). This pattern is depicted in Figure 4. Thus, we were able to confirm in 
Experiment 2 our main findings that law acted as a focal point to influence behavior in a game 
involving coordination (here, BOS) but not in a PD involving no coordination. 
______________________________ 
Figure 4 about here 
______________________________ 
 
 
IV. Summary and Discussion 
 
In these experiments, we have extended our earlier findings that non-binding third party 
expression such as law can influence behavior merely by making one behavioral outcome salient. 
We sought to test directly and specifically the effect of legal rules in highly contextualized 
                                                 
5
 As with Experiment 1, we are not claiming that the failure to find a legitimacy effect in this experiment means 
there is none generally. We intentionally created a context in which we thought the law would have minimal 
legitimacy, so as to ensure that we would have scope for the focal point effect to operate. 
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narrative vignettes, rather than the general effect of third-party expression in the abstract 
strategic setting used previously. Between the two experiments we report here we varied the 
contexts in three ways to test the robustness of the focal effect, using different factual settings, 
different legal settings, and different strategic (game) settings. The first experiment involved a 
property dispute concerning a cat where we compared the effect of a mandatory legal rule on 
behavior in a HD and PD game. The second involved a contract negotiation where we compared 
the effect of a default rule on behavior in a BOS and PD game. Each experiment confirms that 
legal rules can create a focal point around which people tend to coordinate in a mixed motive 
coordination game. 
For each experiment, the key to identifying a novel influence of law was to control for 
the influences already well established in the literature: the role of sanctions and legitimacy. We 
excluded the effect of sanctions in Experiment 2 by using default rules, which impose no 
sanctions because the parties are free to change the rule. In Experiment 1, we excluded the effect 
of sanctions by explaining in the narrative that, given the nature of the dispute, neither side 
would resort to the courts and that the police would not get involved; in addition, we showed the 
subjects payoffs that did not vary between the Law and No-Law conditions.  
The more complex methodological challenge was to control for the effect of legal 
legitimacy, given that the invocation of law in our narratives could invoke the power of 
legitimacy. Here, we used a difference in differences approach. Because the focal point theory 
applies only in situations requiring coordination between multiple equilibria, we contrasted such 
settings – HD and BOS games – with an otherwise identical setting with only one equilibrium 
and no need for coordination – a PD game. In each game setting we compared behavior with and 
without law. We found that law has a greater effect in the HD and BOS settings than the PD 
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setting, essentially, that the law’s legitimacy plus focal effect is significantly greater than its 
legitimacy effect alone. Thus, despite the fact that there were no sanctions for ignoring the law in 
the dispute in which participants imagined themselves, the presence of law made it more likely 
that they would defer to the other party’s claim, compared to when law was absent. And the 
effect emerged only in the game in which law could function to provide a focal point.  
If our results are reliable, then there is one more way in which law may influence behavior: 
not only because people tend to defer to what they perceive as legitimate authority nor only 
because individuals are deterred (or incapacitated) by legal sanctions, nor only these two 
influences together, but also because law constructs a focal point in situations of coordination. 
Although it is difficult to isolate the focal point power in the field, given that law’s salience is 
usually bound up with its legitimacy and sanctions, we do think the theory helps to understand 
the effect of certain laws in “everyday life” (Ewick & Silbey 1998; Serat & Kearns 1995). We 
illustrate the significance of the research presented here by returning to some of the examples we 
used to illustrate the focal point theory. 
Perhaps the most “everyday” example is traffic. However mundane this field of human 
interaction is, the annual deaths from automobile accidents – 43,000 in the United States 
(NHTSA Report 2006) and over a million worldwide (WHO Report 2004) – demonstrate the 
importance of traffic regulation. Yet traffic is quintessentially a matter of coordination, where 
drivers usually prefer that everyone yield to them but nonetheless rank yielding to others as 
better than the collision that occurs where neither yields. For this reason, we think it would be a 
serious mistake to study compliance and non-compliance with the rules of the road without 
understanding the possibility of a focal point effect. Indeed, there is every reason to think that the 
government exploits the focal point effect for its traffic rules because (1) those rules are 
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relatively clear and (2) the government publicizes them by requiring driver’s tests and by the 
posting of traffic signs. Thus, without denying the effect of sanctions and legitimacy, we 
conjecture that the focal effect is a significant cause of the compliance with traffic laws, which is 
substantial despite obvious examples of violations (such as speeding). When a driver 
approaching a busy intersection observes a sign or traffic light indicating “stop” or “yield,” she 
has a strong reason to comply independent of sanctions and legitimacy. Even if she has no fear of 
or respect for law, she fears an accident. Knowing that others expect her to comply, and that mis-
coordination entails a serious risk of collision, her best choice is to comply. 
Similarly, there is a pervasive element in coordination in the kind of disputes and 
negotiations more typically studied by Law and Society scholars (e.g., Macaulay, 1963; Erlanger 
et al., 1987; Edelman, et al., 1993). All that is necessary (among other possibilities) is that the 
parties involved in a dispute jointly regard some outcome as the worst result. If so, then while the 
existence of the dispute means there is genuine conflict, there is also a common desire to avoid 
some mutually bad outcome. Two people who contest ownership or use of property may each 
regard violence as the worst outcome, worse even than giving in to the other’s claim. A smoker 
and a non-smoker may each regard a profane shouting match as the worst outcome of their 
conflict over smoking. Two groups of union members may dispute over whether to strike but 
jointly regard the worst outcome as internal disunity that weakens their power against 
management. A man and woman who disagree over the acceptability of sexual banter and 
touching in the workplace may each rank the worst outcome as the violence, shouting match, or 
workplace disunity that results if both fail to defer to the other’s demand. In each case of 
disputing and negotiating, the law may influence the behavior in part merely by pointing to a 
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particular resolution and thereby making that outcome focal. Expecting the party favored by the 
focal point to insist, the other party is more likely to defer. 
Finally, we wish to observe that non-legal actors construct focal points in ways that remain 
highly relevant to legal studies. We begin by noting that law is not merely a means of resolving 
disputes, it supplies another means of disputing. What is true of violence, shouting matches, and 
organizational disunity is often true of litigation – that a lawsuit is so costly to each side that both 
regard it as the worst outcome (Kritzer, 1991) . Not always, of course – sometimes the worst 
outcome is giving in to the other side – but sometimes. Two divorcing parents who each seek 
primary custody of their child may regard the worst outcome as depleting savings intended for 
their child’s college tuition by litigating over custody. An employer may regard protracted 
litigation as worse than rehiring the employee who claims to have been fired illegally, while the 
employee may regard such litigation (and the resulting reputation of being a troublemaker) as 
worse than giving up and seeking a new job. (E.g., Bumiller 1988). Members of a school board 
may regard expensive litigation over a Free Exercise or Establishment Clause claim as worse 
than giving up the challenged practice, while the plaintiff may regard expensive litigation as 
even worse than living with what she regards as a constitutional rights violation. (E.g., Dolbeare 
1971; Muir 1967). In every case, each side would most prefer that the other side give in and 
therefore getting one’s way without expensive litigation. (Otherwise, one side would simply give 
in). But because protracted litigation is the worst outcome, each side will try to convince the 
other to be the first to give in, but each will also prefer to give in if they become convinced the 
other side will not. 
Where this situation occurs, one possible result is the frequently observed “gap” in the law-
on-the-books and the law-in-action. (E.g., Bumiller 1988; Muir 1967; Rosenberg 1991). Formal 
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law may grant an individual or group some right, but if the litigation necessary to vindicate the 
right is too costly, the party entitled to prevail will regard protracted litigation as the worst 
possible outcome. Even if the defendant who should lose under the law also regards expensive 
litigation as the worst possible outcome, there is no certainty that the defendant will back down. 
Indeed, if a new law is meant to change the existing equilibrium behavior, but each side regards 
litigation as sufficiently costly, then the status quo behavior may remain the obvious focal point, 
meaning that the law fails to change behavior. If a new law nonetheless does change behavior, 
the reason may be the social movement that changed the law also created a focal point extra-
legally around the new behavior, causing prospective plaintiffs to act aggressively in asserting 
their and for prospective defendants to expect as much. As we stated at the outset, the focal point 
theory says that any expression may construct a focal point; while we apply the theory to legal 
expression, it also applies to the expression of social movement leaders (and resistors) whose 
actions may then determine the effect of the law. Thus, we make no special claim for law, merely 
that the existing literature has overlooked that it is one means among many for directly (i.e., 
without changing payoffs or wielding legitimacy) influencing expectations in situations of 
coordination. Yet our findings may also shed light on the success of social movements where 
non-legal actors wield the same expressive power. 
 
V. Future Research 
 Future studies might examine certain factors held constant in our experiments, to gain a 
better understanding of the boundary conditions of the focal point effect. For example, in the two 
experiments reported here, the materials were intentionally designed to minimize the role of legal 
legitimacy. But one might wonder about the extent to which a focal point would operate in the 
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presence of legal legitimacy. Of course, in situations where legitimacy exerts a very strong 
effect, then factors like sanctions and focal points might not add anything to compliance. But 
very strong legal legitimacy may be more of an exception than a rule. 
Another variation of interest that could be addressed in future studies is the messier but far 
more common situation where parties do not make simultaneous decisions. In the two 
experiments reported here, we intentionally incorporated simultaneous decisions into the 
scenarios so that we could cleanly demonstrate the ability of law to function as a focal point. In 
the future, other studies could add a layer of complexity by examining the extent to which the 
focal point effect of law operates in a more dynamic setting of negotiating in the shadow of the 
law. 
We have noted that it is difficult to test the focal point claim in the field, especially to gather 
evidence sufficient to satisfy the skeptic that the focal point effect is real. Yet if one takes our 
experiment as sufficient to make the claim empirically plausible, we believe that qualitative field 
research is also possible. Those conducting ethnographies may find the theory illuminating and 
also be able to contribute additional evidence. If individuals engaged in real world disputes or 
negotiations reveal that they prefer giving in to the conflict or non-agreement that results when 
neither party gives in, then the researcher has identified a situation involving coordination. If 
these same individuals believe that the other party will act in accordance with law (not giving in 
because the law is in their favor or giving in because the law is against them), then the researcher 
can investigate whether the focal point contributes to the expectation of compliance. The most 
obvious case is whether one can rule out other explanations: not sanctions if there is no fear of 
sanctions and not legitimacy if the influenced party does not appear to understand the law as 
being legitimate or authoritative. At the least, the focal point theory cautions against too quickly 
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equating legal influence with legal legitimacy. A disputant may give in to the law without 
recognizing the law’s authority. Finally, those in the field may test the idea that, where litigation 
is too expensive a means of disputing, the effect of the law depends on focal points created by 
social movement leaders and resistors. 
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Table 1: Description of Consequences Given to Participants in Experiment 1 
CHOICE What Happens Equivalent in $$ 
You:  Insist  
Morgan:  Gives In 
 
You get to keep Whiskers/Boots 
 
You: $400  
Morgan: $0 
 
You:  Insist  
Morgan:  Insists 
 
[HD condition]: 
Friendly Francis gives away 
Whiskers/Boots, never to be seen again 
and maybe destroyed  
 
[PD condition]: 
Friendly Francis gives away 
Whiskers/Boots to a distant but 
responsible owner 
 
[HD condition]: 
You: -$200 (minus $200)  
Morgan: -$200 (minus $200) 
 
 
[PD condition]: 
You: $50 
Morgan: $50 
You:  Give In  
Morgan:  Gives In 
Whiskers/Boots goes to Francis’ friend 
who lets you have visitation 
 
You: $100  
Morgan: $100 
You:  Give In  
Morgan:  Insists 
Morgan gets to keep Whiskers/Boots You: $0  
Morgan: $400 
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Table 2. Party Preferences Regarding Remedies, Experiment 2 
 
PD Game 1st choice 2nd choice 3rd choice 
George Remedy 1 No Contract Remedy 2 
Participant Remedy 2 No Contract Remedy 1 
 
   
BOS Game    
George Remedy 1 Remedy 2 No Contract 
Participant Remedy 2 Remedy 1 No Contract 
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Figure 2. Percent Insisting by Game and Focal Point, Experiment 1 
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Figure 4. Percent Insisting by Game and Focal Point, Experiment 2 
 
 
